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Abstract 
Over the next fifty years the potential impact on human livelihoods of environmental 
change  could  be  considerable.  One  possible  response  may  be  increased  levels  of 
human mobility. This paper offers a first quantification of the levels of environmental 
migration to the United Kingdom that might be expected. The authors apply Bijak and 
Wiśniowski’s (2010) methodology for forecasting migration using Bayesian models. 
They seek to advance the conceptual understanding of forecasting in three ways. First, 
the paper is believed to be the first time that the Bayesian modelling approach has 
been attempted in relation to environmental mobility. Second, the paper examines the 
plausibility  of  Bayesian  modelling  of  UK  immigration  by  cross-checking  expert 
responses  to  a  Delphi  survey  with  the  expectations  about  environmental  mobility 
evident in  the recent  research literature. Third, the values and assumptions  of the 
expert evidence provided in the Delphi survey are interrogated to illustrate the limited 
set of conditions under which the forecasts of environmental mobility, as set out in 
this paper, are likely to hold.     
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1. Introduction 
 
It  seems  highly  likely  that  environmental  change  will  impact  significantly  of  the 
distribution  of  world  population  over  the  next  fifty  years  (Stern,  2007;  House  of 
Commons, 2008). Increased levels of human mobility may be one possible response 
to climate change (Black et al., 2011a; Pecoud and Geiger, 2011), but there is huge 
uncertainty about precisely how many people will move and about the destinations 
that they will choose. Recent research (Piguet et al., 2011; Government Office for 
Science (GOS), 2011) contradicts earlier assertions that climate change will produce 
mass  environmental  migration  (Myers,  1993,  Stern  2007).  This  recent  wave  of 
research  suggests  that  where  environmental  movement  occurs,  it  will  be  focused 
mainly in the poorer nations of the world, and that regions such as north-west Europe 
will receive few migrants compared with the scale of environmentally-driven short 
distance moves that will take place in Asia and Africa (Black et al., 2011b; de Haas, 
2011).  
The research reported in this paper seeks, for the first time, to offer some quantitative 
estimates  of  the  scale  of  environmental  migration  to  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
analysis combines  expert opinion with time series datasets to produce a Bayesian 
forecast of so-called environmental migration to the UK by 2060. It is argued that 
more important than the empirical dimensions of the forecast, is the approach taken 
by the research team. This demonstrates first, that there can be value in seeking expert 
opinion in areas where other evidence is lacking. Second, it points to the folly of 
giving too much weight to single ballpark estimates of environmental mobility, and 
instead  underscores  the  value  in  examining  both  the  sources  of  uncertainty  in 
forecasts of this kind and the values and assumptions of experts in making migration 
forecasts.  Whilst  the  authors  are  perfectly  aware  of  the  difficulties  with 
conceptualisation and definition of ‘environmental migration’ (see also GOS, 2011), 
the current study attempts to reflect the surrounding ambiguities in a formal manner, 
through the uncertainty of the relevant estimates and predictions. 
The paper opens with a brief summary of what the research literature suggests about 
mobility trends in relation to environmental change. There subsequently follows a 
discussion of the researchers’ methodology. It then considers in detail the results of   2 
the Bayesian forecast, before turning to evaluate how the results might be interpreted. 
Is it plausible, as the median forecast implies, that there will be very little additional 
environmental migration directed towards the UK over the next 50 years? What are 
the policy implications of such outcomes? 
2. Expectations of Human Mobility in an Era of Environmental 
Change 
 
The frequency and severity of extreme environmental events seem set to increase over 
the  next  fifty  years  (GOS,  2011).  Although  there  seems  a  broad  consensus  of 
scientific  opinion  linking  the  observation  of  increased  environmental  hazards  to 
climate change, there is less agreement about what the likely impacts will be on a 
range of human activities including human migration (Gemenne, 2011; Piguet et al. 
2011; Warner, 2009). Early estimates by environmentalists (Myers, 1993) focused on 
forecasting the numbers of people who would be displaced because they were living 
in areas deemed to be at high risk of an identifiable environmental process linked to 
global warming (such as sea level rise). This literature has been widely reviewed and 
we do not rehearse the arguments once again here (Black et al., 2011b; Gemenne, 
2011).  
Only in the last few years has a systematic attempt been made to gather field evidence 
on  the  nature  of  environmentally-linked  mobility  (Castles,  2011;  Kniveton  et  al., 
2008; Warner et al., 2009). Reviews of this literature show that most environmentally-
linked mobility is short distance and within country and that perhaps the greatest risk 
is human immobility in the face of environmental change (Findlay, 2011). The recent 
migration  systems  emphasis  in  the  study  of  human  mobility  in  an  era  of 
environmental change has led to recognition of the complex and entangled nature of 
migration motivations and to the recommendation that researchers should focus on 
understanding  the  role  of  environmental  forces  in  impacting  existing  migration 
regimes,  both  directly  and  indirectly  (Black  et  al.,  2011a,  2011b),  as  opposed  to 
making  estimates  based  on  the  populations  of  areas  at  highest    risks  of  rapid 
environmental change. This multi-causal approach also  recognises the diversity of 
mobility  responses  that  can  emerge  in  association  with  different  types  of 
environmental  events.  Piguet  et  al.  (2011),  for  example,  make  the  important 
distinction  between  temporary  moves  (three  months  or  less)  following  an   3 
environmental event, short-term displacement (three months to a year), and migration 
(one  year  or  more),  and  note  the  different  mobility  responses  to  hazards  such  as 
hurricanes and typhoons from those witnessed in relation to slow onset disasters such 
as drought-linked famines (see also Laczko et al. 2009).  
The  environmentalist  perspective  continues  to  inform  much  of  the  contemporary 
debate on climate change (Stern, 2007) and the implications for human mobility. In 
looking to the future it tends to uphold the popular perception that many millions of 
people will leave areas adversely affected by climate change, possibly in favour of 
more  secure  lives  in  the  global  north.  By  contrast,  recent  research  on  migration 
regimes affected by environmental change points to high levels of immobility, and 
challenges the view that environmental change will result in significant international 
migration flows into many of the wealthier countries (de Hass, 2011; Findlay, 2011). 
Instead Black et al. (2011a) and GOS (2011) suggest that migration over the decades 
ahead may shift more people into those areas that are at greatest environment risk in 
the  poorer  countries  of  the  world,  such  as  low  lying  large  urban  areas  in  the 
developing world (Seto, 2011).  
The literature reviewed above presents an interesting challenge when applied to the 
question  of  how  immigration  to  the  UK  will  change  in  an  era  of  environmental 
change. On the one hand, the environmentalist perspective would lead to concern that 
over  the  decades  ahead  the  scale  of  environmentally-linked  immigration  would 
increase  substantially  and  come  to  account  for  an  ever-greater  proportion  of  new 
arrivals in the country. On the other hand, the migration regimes perspective might 
point to a rather different future, with attention focussing instead on the pattern of the 
UK’s  current  migration  linkages  and  the  prospects  of  environmental  change  in 
countries close to the UK resulting in population displacement. Remarkably, given the 
significance of the issue, the research literature offers very little evidence to inform 
these very different views of future environmental mobility to the UK. Most recent 
environmental  mobility  research  has  focussed  on  other  parts  of  the  world  (for 
example, Kniveton et al., 2011; Lilleor et al., 2011) where concerns about the current 
impact of climate change are perceived to be greater. One possible exception is the 
recent study by Fielding (2011), but his study (looking at the effects of environmental 
change  over  the  next  fifty  years  on  inter-regional  migration  in  UK)  is  limited  to 
internal mobility and thus cannot answer questions about the effects of climate change   4 
on future environmentally-linked immigration to Britain. This leads therefore to the 
central goals of this paper: to forecast environmental migration to the UK over the 
next  50  years and to evaluate the plausibility of these forecasts given the limited 
nature of the evidence available on the topic.   
3. Research Methodology 
  
The  key  feature  of  the  researchers’  methodology  is  bringing  together  expert 
knowledge and historical data series to generate estimates of gross immigration, and 
environmentally-related migration, as well as measures of uncertainty associated with 
these forecasts. The methodology used a Delphi survey of experts embedded within 
the Bayesian statistical modelling framework, as depicted in Figure 1 and described in 
more  detail  in  the  next  section  (for  an  introductory-level  exposition  of  Bayesian 
statistics, see e.g. Bernardo 2003). 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The Bayesian approach for forecasting environmental mobility 
3.1. Bayesian modelling  
The data series used in the Bayesian modelling drew on ONS (Office for National 
Statistics) figures on total immigration to the UK from 1975 onwards. The Bayesian 
approach used in this analysis has two main advantages over conventional approaches 
to  migration  forecasting.  First,  in  using  probability  distributions  to  handle 
uncertainties  attached  to  the  predictions,  the  forecasts  go  beyond  the  normal 
presentation of one number predicted for each year and instead create a probability 
fan which indicates the degree of uncertainty around the mean or median (Abel et al., 
2010).  Second,  Bayesian  models  have  the  capacity  to  formally  allow  for  expert 
opinions  to  be  built  into  projections  in  the  form  of  prior  distributions  (Bernardo, 
2003).  Prior  distributions  in  Bayesian  modelling  inform  the  parameters  of  the 
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statistical model and are independent of any existing data. In this case it is subjective 
expert  opinion  which  constitutes  the  prior  distributions.  To  this  end,  the  most 
important aspects of the Delphi questionnaire used in this study were the questions 
relating to future volumes of immigration and immigration related to environmental 
change. Central to the construction of Bayesian model forecasts is consideration of 
subjective definition of probability, which in this case equates to the respondents’ 
confidence in the accuracy of their answers.  
The modelling framework used in this paper is to predict immigration to UK solely 
based on its past history using a univariate autoregressive (AR) model. An extensive 
treatment of suites of such models in the context of population predictions has been 
provided in Abel et al. (2010), where all the methodological particulars are discussed 
in more detail. For the purpose of the current study, an AR model based on the k-year 
history of immigration, AR(k), is defined as: 
                t
k
i
i t i t ε μ m μ m      


1
 . 
where  mt  refers  to  total  immigration  in  year  t,  taken  as  a  first  difference  of  the 
logarithms of migration volumes.  
The  symbol    denotes  the  overall  mean  level  of  mt;  the  parameters  i  for  
i = 1, ..., k, refer to the ensemble of coefficients of autoregression of mt with its past 
history up to k periods (years) before. Finally, t denotes an error term, conventionally 
assumed to follow a univariate Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 
2, N(0, 

2). All t are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid). 
 
In this study, migration history up to eight years before was examined by way of a set 
of  nine  models,  ranging  from  the  Independent  Normal  (IN)  model,  equivalent  to 
AR(0),  through  AR(1),  etc.  to  AR(8).  For  every  one  of  them,  in  terms  of  prior 
distributions, it was assumed that as well as , all relevant parameters i follow a 
Normal distribution N(0,1). Standard deviation of the error term, , was assumed to 
follow a Normal distribution N(0,100), truncated at zero to ensure the positivity of the 
values of . This assumption is rather vague and reflects lack of strong beliefs a priori 
with respect to the error of immigration forecasts. In the current study, full Bayesian 
inference was applied for all i, , and , although in the last-mentioned case, the   6 
forecasts  drew  on  expert-based  trajectories  obtained  from  the  Delphi  survey,  as 
described  in  the  next  section.  A  fully  expert-based  approach  was  also  applied  to 
obtain the predictions of the share of environmental migrations. This was necessary in 
the absence of any systematic time-series dataset on environmental immigration to the 
UK.  
 
Given that in this exercise nine different models are considered, in order to allow for 
their  goodness  of  fit  with  the  empirical  data,  the  procedure  of  Bayesian  model 
selection  and  averaging  was  applied  (Raftery  1995).  In  this  approach,  models 
themselves  are  being  assigned  prior  probabilities,  adding  up  to  unity,  which  are 
subsequently updated according to how much support from data a particular model 
has. The resulting posterior probabilities, also adding up to one, can be then used to 
select the best fitting model (i.e. the one with the highest probability), or to average 
forecasts  yielded  by  different  models,  using  these  probabilities  as  weights.  In  the 
current  case, the nine models  were assumed a priori  to  be equi-probable, without 
preference to  any one of them, so  the prior probability of each of them  equalled 
11.1% (i.e. 1/9).  
 
In  computing  the  posterior  probabilities  of  particular  models  given  the  data,  the 
bridge  sampler  algorithm  was  applied  (Meng  &  Wong  1996).  Additionally,  two 
measures of goodness of fit of models, also used in classical (frequentist) statistics, 
were calculated: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian (Schwartz) 
Information Criterion (BIC). These measures are described in more detail in Congdon 
(2003: 32–33), whereas a discussion of the general methodology of Bayesian model 
selection in the context of a series of AR(k) models is provided in Abel et al. (2010). 
The  Bayesian  calculations  were  based  on  10,000  iterations  of  the  estimation 
algorithm, with 1,000 initial iterations discarded.   
 
3.2. Elicitation of Expert Opinion  
In  order  to  construct  the  prior  distributions  for  the  forecasting  model,  expert 
information on environmental mobility was obtained through engaging in a two-round 
Delphi survey. This produced information that shaped the model parameters.  Expert 
views  may  be  gathered  in  a  variety  of  ways  (O’Hagan,  2011),  but  one  well-  7 
established approach in situations involving long-range forecasts of uncertain futures 
has been the Delphi survey method (Hill and Fowles, 1975; Linstone and  Turoff, 
1975).  This  perspective  involves  asking  experts  their  views  on  a  particular  topic 
(round 1) and then bringing them together as a panel (round 2) to explore the reasons 
why they gave the answers that they did and then giving them the opportunity to 
amend their responses in the light  of the opinions  of the other experts. This  is  a 
recognised approach to handling uncertainty in a forecasting context (Schmidt, 1997) 
and has been previously used in migration modelling (Bijak and Wiśniowski, 2010). 
As has been highlighted by the literature on elicitation, obtaining information about 
uncertainty  is  universally  difficult  (Szreder  and  Osiewalski,  1992;  Kadane  and 
Wolfson,  1998;  Dey  and  Liu,  2007;  O’Hagan,  2011)  and  so  far  no  completely 
satisfactory solution has been developed. 
In  this  instance  the  views  of  27  experts  were  canvassed,  with  heterogeneous 
backgrounds, which is a desirable feature of a Delphi exercise. Eleven of the experts 
were  demographers  (migration  and  demographic  specialists)  and  sixteen  were 
stakeholders  in  the  Government  Office  for  Science  Foresight  Project  (2011)  on 
Migration and Global Environmental Change. Round 1 involved survey respondents 
independently  completing  a  questionnaire  on  current  and  future  environmental 
migration trends to the UK. From the point of view of forecasting, two groups of 
questions were most relevant. The first comprised questions aimed at eliciting target 
distributions of total immigration, as well as of the shares of environmental migration, 
for 2030 and 2060. Additionally, one question dealt with the share of environmental 
migration in 2010, since currently no relevant data are available. In this way, we also 
tried  to  reflect  the  ambiguity  surrounding  the  very  concept  and  definition  of 
‘environmental migration’. The second group of questions dealt with the impact of 
particular demo-economic covariates.    
In round 2 the aggregated results were presented to the same panel of experts at a 
specially convened meeting held in London in March 2011. An important part of the 
research process involved considering what types of moves might qualify as being 
linked to  environmental change. Audio recordings  were taken during the round 2 
meeting and some quotations from these discussions are included in this paper to 
provide an understanding of the reasoning behind the choices made by the experts in 
their predictions. This approach is considered valuable since participants are given the   8 
opportunity to discuss their responses and then either affirm or change their initial 
estimates.    
The questions on the target values of the immigration to the UK, as well as of the 
shares  of  migration  related  to  environmental  reasons,  were  elicited  in  a 
straightforward fashion. The indicated values  were treated  as  means  of respective 
probability distributions, which were assumed to be log-normal for total immigration 
volumes (allowing positive values) and of Beta type for shares (allowing only values 
from the range between 0 and 1). Additionally, for each of the interim periods (2011–
2029 and 2031–2059), the shares of environmental migration suggested by the experts 
were linearly interpolated. 
Since both log-normal and Beta distributions require two parameters to be specified, 
the  second  ones  were  computed  based  on  the  answers  to  the  questions  about  the 
confidence  of  experts  about  the  values  or  shares  quoted  before.  The  measures  of 
confidence were obtained on a 100 point scale, ranging from 1 (very unsure) up to 
100 (very sure). These questions were asked for all point estimates of future levels of 
migration and percentages of environmental migrants, and have been subsequently 
judgmentally mapped onto the scale of the variables in question, to match either the 
order  of  magnitude  of  the  total  number  of  immigrants,  or  of  the  share  of 
environmentally-related migration.  
The mapping procedure was as follows: first of all, in each case, a total variance was 
calculated. This was done initially by calculating the overall weighted average of all 
individuals’ mean response, where the respondent’s confidence answers were used as 
weights.  The  total  variance  was  then  derived  as  the  summation  of  the  squared 
difference between this weighted average and each respondent’s mean (scaled by the 
confidence  level),  divided  by  the  total  number  of  respondents.  An  individual’s 
variance term, in its log-normal distribution, was then calculated by dividing the total 
variance by respondent’s reported level of confidence. Individual means and derived 
variance  were  used  as  method-of-moments  estimates  (obtained  by  matching  the 
empirical  mean  and  variance  with  their  analytical  forms,  depending  on  the 
parameters) to calculate Beta distribution parameter for the share of environmental 
immigrants.   9 
The  100-point  scale  was  intended  to  provide  a  subjective  measure  of  uncertainty 
surrounding  future levels provided in the preceding questions. This question was not 
aimed at eliciting confidence intervals. Given the heterogeneity of the expert panel, 
we  could  not  assume  that  a  question  requiring  statistical  background  would  be 
understood  consistently  across  the  respondents.  Instead,  a  subjective  score  with  a 
wide range of options (1 to 100) was intended to allow the experts more flexibility 
and scope for manoeuvre between both Delphi rounds. During the second round of the 
Delphi some respondents raised issues with the use of the 1 to 100 scale, and the 
placing of their level  of uncertainty, especially  in  the middle of the range. These 
concerns  are  legitimate.  However,  as  pointed  out  by  the  literature  on  elicitation, 
obtaining  information  about  uncertainty  is  universally  difficult  and  so  far  no 
consensus has emerged in the academy as to the ideal solution. In addition, during the 
second  round  of  the  Delphi  survey,  when  faced  with  all  responses  from  the  first 
round, the participants were able to move towards a shared understanding of the scale 
and the underlying concept of subjective uncertainty. In some cases respondents may 
have also adjusted their uncertainty in light of discussions. In general, the aim of 
choosing a point scale subjective measure of uncertainty was thus to obtain a shared 
understanding  of  its  meaning  by  the  second  round  of  the  Delphi  survey,  despite 
differences in the methodological background of the experts. Hence, the second round 
responses  to  questions  on  uncertainty  reflect  subjective  views  of  individual 
respondents relative to the whole expert panel. It is worth stressing that Bayesian 
forecasts  are  characterised  by  inevitably  subjective  elements,  since  they  are 
conditional on expert opinion being linked to the past history obtained from the data 
series. 
The  ultimate  distributions  for  the  target  parameters  in  question  were  derived  by 
‘averaging’ individual distributions – log-normal for volumes and Beta for rates – 
obtained for particular experts. In formal probabilistic terms, the final distributions 
were mixtures of expert-specific ones, where each expert was given an equal weight 
(probability) of inclusion in the final output. 
As researchers, we would wish to acknowledge that the approach we have taken has a 
number of methodological limitations.  One is that, despite being considered experts 
in the field, the participants had imperfect knowledge and their input, upon which the 
model parameters are based, is inherently subjective, and the resulting forecasts are   10 
therefore  only  as  good  as  the  experts’  knowledge  allows.  Another  issue  is  in 
interpreting the expert answers to the survey. Some participants commented that terms 
such environmental migrants were ambiguous and that the use of a 0–100 per cent 
confidence scale was confusing. It is thus possible that respondents interpreted these 
in different ways and that these ambiguities impacted on the findings since it would 
have resulted in the questions being answered in an inconsistent manner. Finally, the 
limited availability of appropriate time-series data on past migration trends and the 
complete absence of any data on environmental migration limit the analysis. Despite 
our reservations on these matters, it remains the case that this paper offers for the first 
time  quantifiable  estimates  of  environmental  movement  into  the  UK  and  of  the 
uncertainty  levels  associated  with  these  forecasts,  which  also  reflect  the  expert 
ambiguities. For this reason we would maintain the paper is not only original but 
highly  significant  in  its  contribution  to  the  debate  over  the  relation  between 
environmental change and migration.   
4. Forecasts of Environmental Migration  
 
By  applying  the  methodology  outlined  above,  univariate  forecasts  of  total  and 
environmental migration to the UK, based on autoregressive models, were obtained. 
The forecasts of the total immigration are weighted averages (technically speaking, 
mixtures)  of  predictions  yielded  by  particular  models,  from  IN  and  AR(1)  up  to 
AR(8).  The  weights  used  were  the  posterior  probabilities  of  particular  models, 
obtained  from  the  bridge  sampler  algorithm  of  Meng  and  Wong  (1996).  In  this 
example,  the  averaged  model  was  58.5%  influenced  by  the  Independent  Normal 
(‘AR(0)’)  model,  21.3%  by  AR(2),  and  16.1%  by  AR(1),  with  a  trace  impact  of 
AR(3) and AR(4). Noteworthy, other goodness-of-fit criteria also pointed to models 
with high posterior probability: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) pointed to 
AR(2), while the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to AR(1).  
 
In order to derive forecasts of environmental migration, the expert-based predicted 
distributions  of  relevant  shares  were  juxtaposed  with  the  results  for  the  overall 
immigration. The resulting forecasts of total and environmental immigration to the 
UK are illustrated respectively in Figures 2 and 3.  
   11 
Figure 2 Forecasts of total immigration to the UK, averaged univariate models (in thousands) 
 
Note: White line on the forecast fan denotes the median forecast of total immigration to the UK. 
Source: Data – ONS; Forecasts – own elaboration in OpenBUGS/R. 
 
The medial  predictions, indicating that  for 50% of the time higher values can be 
expected, and lower values for the remaining 50%, suggest an ever-slower-declining 
trend of total migration, and a long-term stability of environmental migration. Hence, 
in the median trajectory, overall immigration is expected to decline from the recent 
levels of 567,000 in 2009, to 411,000 in 2030, and then to 332,000 in 2060. At the 
same  time,  the  median  trajectory  of  the  volume  of  environmental  migration  is 
expected first to increase slightly from the expert-based estimate of 19,600 thousand 
in 2010, to 26,800 in 2030, and then decline to 24,900 by 2060. With respect to 
environmental migration, Figure 3 clearly shows a discontinuity of the trend around 
2030, resulting from the values having to conform both to overall migration totals, as 
well as to the shares of environmental migration envisaged for 2030 by the experts. 
The values are the result of the impact of the history of migration and its impact on 
the  forecasts  through  the  parameters  of  the  forecasting  model.  In  addition, 
respondent’s answers for the mean levels are weighted by their associated uncertainty 
levels in the prior distributions. 
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Figure 3 Forecasts of environmental immigration to the UK, averaged models (in thousands) 
 
Notes: Black line denotes historical total immigration – the same series as in Figure 2 (rescaled). 
White line on the forecast fan denotes the median prediction of environmental immigration to the 
UK. 
Source: Data – ONS; Forecasts – own elaboration in OpenBUGS/R. 
 
Figure 3 is ground-breaking in providing for the very first time some expert-based 
estimates of the volume of environmental migration to the UK that might occur year 
on year over the next 50 years. It not only shows the possible levels of environmental 
mobility, but perhaps more significantly it predicts that there will not be a continuous 
increase in the number of environmental immigrants, refuting the suggestions of some 
environmentalists  of  an  exponential  rise  in  environmentally-driven  population 
movement by 2060. Of course, the values shown in the diagram (while being the best 
estimate available to decision makers) are only as good as the knowledge base of the 
Delphi panel experts and the univariate modelling procedure that has been employed 
to generate this forecast. Nevertheless, by recognising that the panel of experts was 
selected to represent the best available knowledge on the topic in 2011, and that the 
model has taken into account the panellists self-defined uncertainty about current and 
future  levels  of  environmental  mobility,  the  forecast  provides  the  best  possible 
estimates  ever  generated  of  the  possible  scale  of  environmental  mobility.  This   13 
provides an important baseline for policy makers to work with until better estimates 
can be obtained.  
  
The predictive uncertainty shown in Figure 2 is  – as expected – quite high.  For 
example, the 80% intervals
1, related to chances of one in ten that in any particular 
year the actual total immigration to the UK will be above the given range, and one in 
ten that it will be below, are estimated to be between 131.1 thousand and 1.32 million 
immigrants in 2030, and between 64.0 thousand and 1.75 million in 2060. It has to be 
stressed that these intervals, and in general the probabili ty bounds refer to particular 
years, and not to the whole long -term trajectories of such a volatile process as 
migration.  
 
By definition, the volume of environmental migration must fall below the value of the 
total. Thus, in 2030 between 0.6 and 177.7 thousand immigrations to the UK could be 
caused by environmental drivers, while in 2060, this range could be between 0.6 and 
312.7  thousand.  In  the  short  term,  the  uncertainty  assessment  seem  plausible; 
however, due to the nature of the processes under study, as well as of the forecasting 
models, the intervals beyond 2020 or 2030 clearly become too wide, especially at the 
upper end. From this point of view, the statistical migration forecasts can be useful 
within the horizon of about ten years (see also Bijak  and Wiśniowski 2010). Beyond 
that the exploration of possible futures should be ideally complemented by the means 
of other tools,  such as  scenarios, examples  of  which are  available from  the GOS 
(2011) study. The results of our forecasting exercise presented in the next section 
should be interpreted with these caveats in mind.  
                                                 
1 Probabilistic population forecasters tend to prefer 80% predictive intervals over, for example, 95% 
ones, main arguments being that the former are more robust and less affected by the extremes, and do 
not unnecessarily amplify the impression of uncertainty (Lutz et al. 2004: 37). Besides, as argued by 
Bijak (2010: 107), “such intervals can also provide additional warning to the forecast users, as the 
probability that the process will fall beyond their limits from time to time cannot be neglected.”   14 
5. Discussion of Bayesian forecasts in relation to expert views 
 
Based  on  the  Bayesian  forecasts  obtained  from  extrapolating  immigration  data 
augmented  by  expert  opinion,  Figure  3  suggests  that  probably  environmental 
immigration to UK will not change much over the next 50 years from current levels. It 
is possible that there may be a very slight rise over the next few decades, but that the 
trend is unlikely to be one involving ever-increasing numbers. Instead, the median 
forecast suggests that the total volume of environmental immigration (while hovering 
between 25,000 and 27,000 people between 2030 and 2060) is  not  set  to  expand 
exponentially as Britain moves forward into an era of significant climate change.   
 
In addition, environmental migration will most likely remain a small percentage of the 
overall migration inflow into the UK. The median environmental flows in 2030 and 
2060 correspond to respectively 6.5% and 7.5% of the median total immigration flow. 
In addition to these estimates, Figure 3 provides policy makers with the challenge of 
considering how to respond to unlikely outcomes as well as to the more probable 
estimates around the median line.  
 
How plausible are these forecasts? The plausibility of the results can be considered in 
two ways. First, do they conform to the expectations of academic literature about the 
future  directions  and  volume  of  environmental  mobility?  Second,  the  significance 
attached to them, depends on the credibility given to the reasons provided by the 
experts  in  the  Delphi  panel  for  the  reasoning  behind  the  information  which  they 
provided.  
 
The attempt to review the academic literature in the early part of this paper, led to the 
conclusion  that  there  has  been  little  evidence  that  climate  change  has  produced 
international environmental mobility so far (Castles, 2011), and that immobility rather 
than mobility is the norm (Findlay, 2011). Where environmental forces do produce 
international  migration  it  seems  likely  that  they  will  principally  be  between 
neighbouring countries, with most of the mobility confined to the developing world. 
De Haas (2011) believes that even Europe’s southern borders will not be the scene of 
mass environmental migration. All the evidence from the research literature therefore 
seems  compatible  with  the  forecasts  presented  in  this  paper  of  low  levels  of   15 
environmentally-linked mobility to the UK over the next 50 years, with no significant 
upward trend in the volume of movement.  
 
Turning to the reasons given by the experts for their forecasts, a number of interesting 
points emerge. First, the expert panel anticipated a minor decline in UK immigration 
by 2030. This expectation revolved around perceptions that the relative attractiveness 
of the UK as a migrant destination would recede over time and that tighter controls on 
immigration  would  be  an  effective  barrier.  Two  comments  from  panel  members 
amplify this view.  
 
‘My expectation would be that a lot of the future growth poles globally are 
going to be in the emerging economies and not in OECD economies. And I 
would also make the assumption that British immigration policy will not allow 
in so many migrants… so it is not just a simple matter of economics, we’ll still 
see some immigration but I suspect that it will be lower’.  
(Expert A, London, March 2011)  
‘I focused on how desirable this country will be in 50 years from now and for 
me it is going to be a less desirable country. Southeast Asia will develop so it 
will become more attractive but I believe that people will continue to see this 
country  as  a  desirable  place  to  live  in.  But  you  also  have  to  take  into 
consideration the impact of this government and movements in other countries 
to control migration; so I do not think that immigration to the UK will change 
that much’. 
(Expert B, London, March 2011) 
These comments indicate that one reason that environmental mobility forecasts for the 
UK  appear  stable  over  time  (rather  than  increasing  rapidly)  is  because  the 
demographic  and  other  experts  in  the  Delphi  panel  held  the  views  first,  that  the 
overall  flow  of  immigration  to  the  UK  up to  2060    would  not  be  higher  than  at 
present,  but  rather  would  involve  a  slow  downward  trend  because  of  the  UK’s 
declining attractiveness relative to other destinations and, second, that this trend was 
predicated on the assumption that efforts to impose strict immigration controls would 
to some extent shape these trends.  Since environmental mobility was by definition 
nested  within  the  overall  pattern  of  migration,  the  volume  of  such  moves  was 
inevitably shaped by this overall judgement. 
   16 
Turning  to  views  of  current  levels  of  environmental  mobility  towards  the  UK,  experts 
confirmed  the  view  of  the  academic  literature  that  there  was  currently  very  little 
immigration  to  the  UK  due  to  environmental  change.  Consider  the  following 
comment: 
‘I am of the view that we get very few, if any, environmental migrants and 
that’s because I think that migration is overwhelmingly an economic decision 
or outcome’  
 (Expert C, London, March 2011) 
By the end of round two of the Delphi survey it was clear that there was strong 
agreement  amongst  the  experts  on  this,  and  a  high  degree  of  confidence  was 
attached to this position.  
 
Looking forward 20 years, the view of the experts was that environmental change 
would become a more important contributor in proportional terms to immigration 
to UK than at present (but because overall immigration was falling this did not 
imply an absolute increase).  Even those who felt that there would be an upward 
trend did not expect it to account for more than 20 per cent of total immigration 
(80% of responses estimated environmental mobility to be below 20% of the total). 
Interestingly, those who were most confident in their forecasts, were also those 
most likely to give low estimates of future environmental mobility to the UK. 
 
This view was based on assumptions about how migration systems operate. The 
case was not that there would be minimal human displacement at a global level 
arising from environmental hazards, but that those moving for environmental and 
other reasons would mainly move short distances within the less wealthy countries, 
and even those moving longer distances would be entrained in migration flows to 
destinations other than the UK. For example: 
 
‘What are the things that actually drive people to move from their country or 
their immediate surroundings to a country that is much further away? If you 
look at the flooding that happened in X (Asian country)  …   people .. got 
displaced and many of them don’t want to go back even though that is where 
they have got a potential livelihood … but their decision is not to migrate to 
UK unless they already have links here. Their coping strategy is to say, I have 
family members close by that can provide me with temporary shelter while I 
get on my feet. …So my point is that migration is there, but it is not to the UK.’    17 
(Expert D, London, March 2011) 
The  same  logic,  in  line  with  the  literature  on  how  migrants  select  specific 
destinations,   suggests that much environmental mobility towards the UK will be 
European in origin. This is so, first because this is the origin of most current UK 
immigration and, second, because this is the region within which environmental 
change might impact on populations who are currently likely to select the UK as a 
destination (e.g. agricultural workers from other parts of Europe).    
‘By 2060 from my point of view we will have more intra-European migration 
flows  from  countries  likely  to  suffer  from  climate  change  and  they  are 
southern European countries basically because of water scarcity and issues 
like that. So I mean countries like the UK could be facing immigration flows 
coming from people that are pushed from southern Europe. That is why I have 
chosen a higher rank and in my mind that was due to regional migration’. 
(Expert E, London, March 2011)  
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The  environmental  mobility  forecasts  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that 
environmental  immigration  to  UK  will  not  rise  significantly  over  the  next  few 
decades,  although  it  may  become  a  more  important  share  of  all  UK  immigration 
(Figure 3).  The median forecast  suggests that the total  volume of  environmental 
immigration (while hovering between 25,000 and 27,000 people between 2030 and 
2060) is not set to expand exponentially. The median environmental flows in 2030 
and 2060 correspond to respectively 6.5% and 7.5% of the median total immigration 
flow.  In  addition  to  these  estimates,  Figure  3  provides  policy  makers  with  the 
challenge of considering how to respond to unlikely outcomes as well as to the more 
probable estimates around the median line.  
 
The  outputs  from  the  Bayesian  models  reinforce  arguments  about  the  general 
unpredictability of migration when we look several decades into the future, and the 
shortness of plausible forecast horizons (Bijak 2010). The originality of the approach 
outlined  in  this  paper  has  been  to  offer  an  advance  in  forecasting  environmental 
migration that places uncertainty at the heart of the modeling approach and which 
combines  expert  views  about  generally  unknown  future  levels  of  environmental 
mobility  with  known  historical  data  series  about  overall  migration  levels.  Going   18 
beyond this, our suggestion is that the value of such an approach has been enhanced 
rather than reduced by interrogating, using a multi-round Delphi survey, the meanings 
and  assumptions  underpinning  expert  evidence.  As  such  this  paper  has  been 
innovative in as far as the Delphi element of the methodology has been used not only 
in a conventional fashion (i.e. as a means of turning expert views into metrics that 
were of value for forecasting purposes), but also as a means of eliciting the values and 
meanings underlying the particular expert knowledge of the panel members, and thus 
the envelope of plausibility of the metrics.  
 
In one sense the key result of the approach was the identification of a fan of possible 
environmental  forecasts  developed  from  Bayesian  statistical  modelling.  In  another 
sense the more important result is the recognition by the authors of the limitations of 
this kind of modelling exercise. The authors have argued that it does not undermine 
the  value  of  their  forecasts  to  conclude  that  instead  of  striving  for  (unrealistic) 
precision in forecasting a singular level of future environmental mobility, planners 
and policy makes would be better placed admitting that uncertainty is inevitable and 
inescapable, and to use the migration estimates in a different way from what has been 
conventional. Thus, while the median forecast is of interest, what it tells us mainly is 
the nature of the assumptions of the expert panel. Of just as great an interest are the 
probability fans above and below the median forecast line. They offer an opportunity 
for  decision  makers  to  consider  the  scenarios  that  might  produce  other  kinds  of 
environmental mobility outcomes. In statistical terms these might be considered to be 
just as likely as the median outcome, but they deviate more from the assumptions of 
the experts.  
 
Looking ahead, it is  useful to  note that further methodological  refinement of this 
approach  could  be  sought  in  terms  of  examining  the  effect  of  shifting  from  a 
univariate  model  to  more  powerful  models  –  including  more  sophisticated  causal 
mechanisms  and  a  range  of  different  drivers  –  than  the  researchers  were  able  to 
produce.  Other  directions  for  research  would  be  to  explore  more  sophisticated 
methods for eliciting expert opinions including more rigorous interrogation of the 
meanings given by different experts to the term ‘environmental mobility’. 
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Finally, the policy implications of the environmental mobility forecasts provided by 
this  paper  deserve  thought.  As  Figure  3  has  shown,  it  is  quite  likely  that  future 
environmental immigration to the UK in 2060 will not be much different from the 
current median estimate.  The paper has argued that this is a highly plausible outcome, 
but it is one based on the values and assumptions held by the panel of experts. It is 
also  entirely  in  line  with  the  expectations  of  the  small  body  of  evidence-based 
literature on environmental mobility. Thus, it is an outcome that assumes that overall 
UK immigration levels will fall as we move into the future and that the UK will 
become  a  less  desirable  destination  not  only  for  migrants  in  general  but  for 
environmental migrants in particular. This line of reasoning leads to two conclusions 
of relevance to policy makers and planners.  
 
First, plausible as are the assumptions made by the expert panel, policy makers and 
planners should recognise that there are no immutable laws underpinning the validity 
of these assumptions. Therefore there is great value in exploring the scenarios that 
would  produce  higher  levels  of  overall  migration  and  that  might  make  UK  more 
rather than less attractive to environmentally mobile people in the future.  Recognition 
of  such  circumstances  would  help  in  providing  an  early  warning  of  the  contexts 
within  which  the  UK  might  become  a  significant  destination  for  environmental 
migration flows
2.    
 
Second, if current assumptions hold, the implication is that over the next 50 years 
environmental mobility will focus on other destination regions. This does not absolve 
UK policy makers from taking action, but suggests that in place of focussing on UK 
border  control,  policy  makers  might  usefully  devote  attention  to  international 
development strategies. As suggested by the recent Government Office for Science 
(2011) report on Migration and Global Environmental Change, it points to the need 
for international assistance to be directed to developing relevant adaptation strategies 
for populations in other parts of the world. This is needed on the one hand amongst 
those populations of the global South living in areas of high vulnerability to climate 
change, but who because of poverty are immobile and unable to adapt to the impact of 
these changes on their livelihoods. On the other hand, this would benefit the reception 
                                                 
2 For  example,  if  an  international  body  such  as  the  UN  were  to  grant  legal  status  and  rights  to 
‘environmental refugees’ equivalent to that of the current Geneva convention on political refugees, 
then current immigration policies in UK and elsewhere would be radically impacted   20 
areas of large cities in the global South that have been selected by many millions of 
people seeking a better livelihood, but who have moved to  environmentally-high risk 
destinations in order to achieve it (Black et al., 2011b). In this context, the authors 
hope  that  the  current  study  may  help  contribute  to  changing  the  focus  from  the 
developed  to  developing  countries  –  potentially  much  more  important  migration 
actors in the times of global environmental change. 
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